This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is a third party independent of the implicated parties who propose the punishment. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, we find an independent third party vetoes not only punishment to the cooperators but punishment to the defectors as well. Compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party.
Introduction
Punishment is a common means to enforce cooperation in a society. Numerous laboratory studies have shown that cooperation can sustain even among strangers under peer punishment mechanisms where the implicated parties can propose and enforce punishment on defectors (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Masclet et al., 2003; Falk et al., 2005) . In many naturally occurring environments, however, an independent third party decides whether or how to enforce sanctions proposed by the implicated parties. For example, tribe leaders or organization managers often have to decide whether to implement sanctions requested by the community or organization members. In this paper we take a first step toward understanding how sanctions promote cooperation when enforcers are independent of punishment proposers. 3 Previous studies show that individuals are often willing to impose costly punishment on defectors in view of the long-term benefit of building a cooperative relationship (Gürerk et al., 2006; Gächter et al., 2008) . In addition, negative emotions trigger costly punishment on wrongdoers even when there is no monetary benefit from doing so (Sanfey et al., 2003; Xiao and Houser, 2005; Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009 ). However, emotions experienced by the punishment receivers, such as vengeance or spite, also lead to antisocial punishment (i.e., punishment imposed on cooperators either by cooperators or by defectors).
Based on these previous findings, we construct two hypotheses surrounding the decisions of an independent third party who is empowered with the right to uphold or negate proposals for punishment. On the one hand, a third party, as an outsider, is more likely to veto antisocial punishment (Hypothesis 1) as his judgment is less likely to be influenced by vengeance and more likely to be consistent with the existing social norms (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Xiao, 2010; Cubitt et al. 2011) . Indeed, previous studies on antisocial punishment argue for the importance of "shunning retaliation and centralizing punishment in the hands of the state" (Herrmann et al., 2008) . On the other hand, a third party who is not in the position of the victims and who does not benefit from long-term cooperation may reject imposing costly punishment on the defectors (Hypothesis 2) for reasons such as short-run efficiency. Croson and Konow (2009) also find that impartial spectators punish less than implicated stakeholders due to the difference in their moral judgment.
Antisocial punishment has been shown to have a detrimental effect on cooperation, but punishment toward defectors can promote cooperation (see, e.g., Ertan, et al., 2009; Falk et al., 2005; Herrmann et al. 2008; Masclet et al., 2003; Nikiforakis, 2008; Xiao and Kunreuther, 2011) . Thus, our hypotheses imply that the intervention of a third party is a double-edged sword: It promotes cooperation if antisocial punishment is pervasive, but it reduces cooperation when antisocial punishment is rare.
To test our hypotheses, we design an experiment based on a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game. In the baseline, players can directly impose costly punishment after observing each other's actions. In the target treatment, players make punishment proposals to an independent third party. Punishment will be implemented at the proposer's cost if the third party approves it.
We find the cooperation rate is significantly lower in the target treatment than the baseline. Supporting our hypotheses, the data show that third parties reject both antisocial punishment and punishment towards defectors. Although the third parties' intervention reduces the occurrences of costly punishment, the average earnings are still lower in the target treatment than the baseline.
Experiment
Our experiment consists of two treatments: baseline and third-party approval (TPA). Subjects are randomly assigned to a group of three. Each subject interacts with the same group in the same role (A, B, or C) for 20 periods. 4 In the first stage of each period, subjects A and B decide simultaneously whether to cooperate (Option I) or defect (Option II) in a prisoner's dilemma game (see Table  1 ). The decision results in a payoff, in which the exchange rate is 40 tokens to 1 euro. In the second stage, upon observing each other's choices, A and B simultaneously and independently select how many tokens to deduct from the other player. Every three tokens deducted from the other player costs a player one token. The deduction amount does not go to any player's earnings. The maximum amount of tokens one could be punished is 40 within a period.
In the baseline, C is merely an observer of the experiment. In the TPA treatment, C must decide simultaneously whether to veto the punishment decisions proposed by A and/or B, if any. Punishment proposals are implemented upon C's approval. 5 The punishment proposers do not incur any cost if the proposed punishment is not 4 We use a fixed matching scheme since we are interested in a repeated interaction environment such as firms or communities. 5 In naturally occurring environments, institutions can empower the third party in various ways. For example, the third party can have the right to revise the punishment. As a first step, we adopt a binary decision mechanism to understand the impact of the third party's intervention. We find the cooperation rate is lower under the third party's intervention because the punishment is less severe. One may conjecture that the cooperation rate could be higher if the third party could revise the proposed punishment amount. In our experiment, we do not observe any evidence that the third party's decisions vary on the proposed punishment amount. For example, punishment proposals on defectors lower than 6 tokens are approved in 57 out of 107 cases (53.3%) and those higher than 6 tokens are approved in 118 out of 184 cases (64.1%). Probit regression analysis of the third party's approval decisions indicates that the involved party's proposed punishment amount (for either cooperators or defectors) does not play a significant role in the third party's decisions. This implies that even allowing the third party to revise the proposal may not promote cooperation in our setting. Further studies are needed to understand how different ways of empowering the third party influence the outcome.
approved.
In both treatments, all the decisions are revealed to each player at the end of each period. To keep the information symmetry between treatments, A and B still can see each other's punishment proposals in the TPA treatment even if C bans any of them.
C's earnings in both treatments are independent of the outcome of the game. The program randomly draws a number from the prisoner's dilemma payoff matrix (15, 20, 30, 40) with an equal probability, and this is common knowledge. Moreover, C learns his own earnings only at the end of the experiment, while A and B never know the actual earnings of C. This setting minimizes the possibilities that players' decisions are affected by the comparison of earnings between the third party C and the players A and B.
We conducted our experiment at the CentER lab at Tilburg University. We recruited 37 independent groups for the baseline treatment and 38 groups for the TPA treatment (225 subjects in total). The experiment was programmed and conducted in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Each period counted toward final earnings, resulting in average earnings of €12.90 per person for a 40-minute session. Figure 1 plots the dynamics of the average group cooperation rates in both treatments. We find that the average cooperation rate is significantly lower in the TPA treatment than the baseline (0.47 vs. 0.70, Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.05). To understand the observed treatment effect on cooperation, we test our hypotheses by comparing the punishment decisions across treatments. Given that punishment severity is determined by both the frequency and the amount, we report the expected proposed and enforced punishment amount on the cooperators and defectors across treatments in Figure 2 (Table A1 in the appendix summarizes the punishment frequencies and average amounts across treatments).
Results
We find supporting evidence for Hypothesis 1 that third parties reject antisocial punishment. As shown in Figure 2 , in the TPA treatment, third parties significantly reduce the implementation of antisocial punishment proposals (1.90 vs. 0.91, p < 0.05). The data also support Hypothesis 2 that third parties lower punishment on defectors (6.13 vs. 3.75, p < 0.1). Moreover, our data suggest an indirect effect of third parties' interventions on the punishment proposals especially for the defectors, which may also contribute to the low cooperation level in the TPA treatment. Compared to the baseline, As and Bs propose much less punishment on defectors in the TPA treatment although the difference is not statistically significant (6.13 vs. 14.94, p = 0.13). The proposed antisocial punishment remains very low in the TPA treatment as in the baseline, although it is marginally significantly higher than the baseline (1.90 vs. 1.07, p < 0.1).
Consistent with previous studies, our data suggest that antisocial punishment decreases cooperation while punishment imposed on defectors increases cooperation. In both treatments, cooperators, if not punished, continue cooperating in about 90% of the cases in the next period. In contrast, if punished, cooperators in both treatments continue cooperating in less than 50% of cases. Defectors, if not punished, cooperate in less than 10% of the cases in both treatments in the next period. But when defectors are punished, they switch to cooperation in 22.58% of the cases in the baseline and 35% of the cases in the TPA treatment.
As we discussed above, our hypotheses indicate that the overall effect of the third party's intervention may be determined by how often antisocial punishment occurs. In our experiment, antisocial punishment occurred only in a few cases. In particular, cooperators are punished in 17 out of 1036 cases (1.64%) whereas defectors are punished in 80 out of 444 cases (18.02%) in the baseline. In the TPA treatment, cooperators are proposed to be punished in 54 out of 716 cases (7.54%) whereas defectors are proposed to be punished in 291 out of 804 cases (36.19%). Thus a possible explanation why the third party's intervention leads to a lower cooperation rate is that it largely decreases the positive impact of punishment on defectors in our setting.
Figure 2. Expected punishment amount by treatment
Notes: For each group in each treatment, we calculate the product of the average punishment amount on cooperators (defectors) in a period and the frequencies of punishment decisions on cooperators (defectors). The expected punishment amount is the average of these products. Baseline-C represents antisocial punishment on cooperators in the baseline treatment; TPA-C represents antisocial punishment on cooperators in the TPA; Baseline-D means punishment on defectors in the baseline; TPA-D means punishment on defectors in the TPA. In the baseline, the proposed punishment is also the approved punishment.
Conclusion
Our study offers the first evidence that while third-party intervention controls antisocial punishment, it could lower cooperation in social dilemmas by diminishing punishment on defectors. As a first step, we exclude many features of the punishment mechanism with third-party approval in a naturally occurring environment. For example, we randomly assign a subject to be a third party in the experiment. In reality, the right to be the enforcer is either decided by law (such as judges) or selected by the governed people (such as tribe leaders). Moreover, a third party often benefits from good reputation and cooperation among the involved parties. Nevertheless, our findings draw attention to the importance of studying how these features influence effective punishment institutions when an independent third party is empowered with the right to uphold or negate punishment. Table A1 : Punishment frequencies and average amount across treatments Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. For each group in each treatment, we calculate how often a player's partner proposes (a third party approves) punishment for him if he cooperates (defects). "Punishment frequency" is the average of these numbers. Similarly, for each group in each treatment, we calculate the average punishment amount a player's partner proposes (or approves) if he cooperates (defects). "Average amount" is the average of these numbers. 
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